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NOTE:
FOUNDATIONAL BUT NOT FUNDAMENTAL:
NO RIGHT TO THE ENVIRONMENT
ROBERT TORRES*
The world is on fire, and despite a general consensus among
scientists that climate change is an imminent threat, recent decades have
been devoid of legislatures capable of enacting meaningful legislation.
The flames rage on as our President, an outspoken denier of climate
change, adds fuel to the fire by stripping whatever attempts had been
previously made to mitigate the effects of climate change. Forced to live
in what seems a forsaken world, nineteen youths, a nonprofit
organization, and a scientist on behalf of all future generations brought
suit against the United States government, seeking more robust
environmental protections. In a landmark decision that garnered much
thoughtful attention, Juliana v. United States, held, in pertinent part, that
the U.S. Constitution protects a fundamental right to a climate system
capable of sustaining human life. After nearly a century of looking past
the written words of the Constitution to find intrinsic rights, twenty years
ago the Supreme Court dictated a rigid two-part test for sustaining
alleged fundamental rights. The Glucksberg test came to fruition despite
decades of justices arguing for a more fluid analysis. That is until Justice
Kennedy penned Obergefell v. Hodges. Justice Kennedy carefully
sidestepped Glucksberg so as not to offend it and instead adopted that
fluid approach in finding certain fundamental rights, leaving two
possible paths. This Note argues that under the current formation of
Supreme Court substantive due process jurisprudence, the Constitution
does not protect a fundamental right to a climate capable of sustaining
human life. Neither Glucksberg nor Obergefell provide a proper avenue
through which plaintiffs may successfully seek redress. Rather, plaintiffs
must utilize other mechanisms to effectuate a lasting change, such as
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amending the Constitution, employing the political process, or
persistently litigating in a piecemeal fashion.
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INTRODUCTION
What’s the point in trying? Why sprinkle the front door with water
trickling from the garden hose when the entire house is ablaze?
Certainly, though, the proper course would not be to turn the hose off
and, instead, douse the house in kerosene, stand back, and revel in the
warmth as everything turns to ash. No, the hose must stay wielded; the
fate of future generations rests upon its continued effort, even if little
progress is made. Relatively recent presidential action, coupled with
decades of inaction by a seemingly indifferent legislature, has
functioned as a catalyst in securing a future plagued by a volatile
climate. Specifically, President Trump formally submitted an intent to
withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement,1 rolled back automotive
emissions standards,2 and dropped climate change from the list of
national security threats.3 President Trump has not only actively sought
to loosen regulations aimed at combating harmful emissions, he has

1. Sarah Gibbens, 15 Ways the Trump Administration Has Changed Environmental
Policies, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 1, 2019),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2019/02/15-ways-trump-administrationimpacted-environment/.
2. See id. (saying that under President Obama, the fuel economy targets were aimed at an
average of fifty-four miles-per-gallon by 2025 for all cars made after 2012, but President Trump
has dialed that target back to just thirty-four miles-per-gallon by 2021).
3. See id. (describing how removing climate change from the list of national security threats
reduced the amount of funding for Department of Defense research and created rifts in societal
perception of the impacts of natural weather phenomena).
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also consistently and publicly mocked the very existence of global
warming and climate change.4
Scientific evidence, however, unequivocally shows the climate
system is warming, and human activity is an accelerant.5 Caused by the
emission of greenhouse gases (GHG), the fallout from climate change
will be catastrophic.6 By 2100, the projected rise in sea level resulting
from melting ice caps will devastate coastal cities, drowning their
infrastructure.7 The already extreme natural events will worsen and
become more prevalent, increasing the number of displaced
communities.8 Prolonged periods of drought will ensure wildfires have
no shortage of fuel as they rage through communities, crops, and
forests.9 An increase in global temperature will leave the environment
uninhabitable for certain species, causing extinction and destruction of

4. See Dylan Matthews, Donald Trump Has Tweeted Climate Change Skepticism 115
Times. Here’s All of It., VOX (June 1, 2017, 9:29 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2017/6/1/15726472/trump-tweets-global-warming-paris-climate-agreement (collecting
tweets from the president expressing skepticism for climate change science); see, e.g., Donald
Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 25, 2014, 6:48 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/427226424987385856 (“NBC News just called it the
great freeze - coldest weather in years. Is our country still spending money on the GLOBAL
WARMING HOAX?”); Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 19, 2015, 8:43
PM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/656100109386674176 (“It’s really cold outside,
they are calling it a major freeze, weeks ahead of normal. Man, we could use a big fat dose of
global warming!”).
5. See IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 48 (2014),
https://archive.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf
(stating that it is “extremely likely that more than half of the observed increase in global average
surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by anthropogenic increases in GHG
concentrations and other anthropogenic forcings together”).
6. See THE NAT’L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, RECENT U.S. TEMPERATURE TRENDS 29
http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/our-changing-climate/recent-us-temperaturetrends#narrative-page-16566 (last visited Nov. 19, 2019) (saying that by 2100, a lower emissions
model would see national temperatures rise three to five degrees Fahrenheit, or five to ten
degrees Fahrenheit under an increasing emissions model).
7. See Brady Dennis & Chris Moon, Scientists Nearly Double Sea Level Rise Projections
for 2100, Because of Antarctica, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2016, 1:44 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/03/30/antarctic-loss-coulddouble-expected-sea-level-rise-by-2100-scientists-say/ (“Places as far flung as South Florida,
Bangladesh, Shanghai, Hampton Roads in Virginia and parts of Washington, D.C. could be
engulfed by rising waters. . . .”).
8. United States Geological Survey, What are the Long-Term Effects of Climate Change,
https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/what-are-long-term-effects-climate-change-1?qtnews_science_products=3#qt-news_science_products (last visited Nov. 29, 2020).
9. Id.
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ecosystems.10 To wit, the global community will even face an increase
in the spread of infectious diseases.11
In fact, the battle to gain a consensus in the scientific community
that climate change poses a very imminent and real threat was long
fought and seldom saw advancements.12 Since its inception more than
120 years ago, the idea asserted by Svante Arrhenius that the presence
or absence of GHGs in the atmosphere dictates whether the Earth will
be warmer or cooler had been widely met with criticism.13 In 1896,
obviously incapable of possessing the foresight necessary to fully
appreciate the vast growth that would shortly ensue, Svante Arrhenius
opined, based on GHG emissions at the time, that thousands of years
would pass before the effects of global warming were realized.14 Over
just a century later, it is clear that the constant, almost completely
unabated, GHG emissions have left us without thousands of years to
act.15
Wary, the legislature is unwilling to (or incapable of) enacting
meaningful environmental protection to remedy our forefathers’
oversight.16 Our Children’s Trust, a nonprofit with a mission to
preserve the climate for present and future generations alike, filed suit

10. How Climate Change Plunders the Planet, ENV’T. DEF. FUND,
https://www.edf.org/climate/how-climate-change-plunders-planet (last visited Sept. 18, 2020).
11. Mary E. Wilson, Environmental Change and Infectious Diseases, ECOSYSTEM HEALTH,
Mar. 2000, at 7–12.
12. Stephan Harding, The Long Road to Enlightenment, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2007),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2007/jan/08/climatechange.climatechangeenvironme
nt.
13. See id. (arguing that Arrhenius’ findings that doubling carbon dioxide in the atmosphere
could raise global temperatures by five to six degrees Celsius were “virtually ignored by scientists
obsessed with explaining the ice ages”).
14. Svante Arrhenius, On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature
of the Ground, 41 PHIL. MAG. & J. SCI. 237 (1896).
15. See IPCC, supra note 5, at 65 (indicating climate change will risk food and water security,
especially in poorer populations, and increase the likelihood of severe illness and disruptions of
livelihoods due to storm surge, sea level rise, and coastal flooding, among many other potential
consequences during the 21st century).
16. Credited with beginning the modern environmental movement, Rachel Carson in Silent
Spring perhaps said it best: “If the Bill of Rights contains no guarantees that a citizen shall be
secure against lethal poisons distributed either by private individuals or by public officials, it is
surely only because our forefathers, despite their considerable wisdom and foresight, could
conceive of no such problem.” Mia Hammersley, The Right to a Healthy and Stable Climate:
Fundamental or Unfounded?, 7 ARIZ. J. ENV’T. L. & POL’Y 117, 120 (2017) (quoting RACHEL
CARSON, SILENT SPRING, 12 (1962)).
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in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon alleging,
in pertinent part, a fundamental right to a healthy and stable climate.17
This Note analyzes whether the plaintiffs’ claims in Juliana v.
United States, under controlling substantive due process precedent,
constitute a validly constructed fundamental right, providing
protection from government infringement on the environment. Part
One of this Note begins the analysis with an in-depth discussion of the
holdings and procedural history of Juliana to provide an understanding
of the gravitas of the complaint. Despite the many areas of controversy
stemming from Juliana, this note only addresses the holding in which a
fundamental right to a climate capable of sustaining human life is
found. As such, Part Two, Subdivision A, necessarily combs through
Supreme Court substantive due process jurisprudence leading up to
Washington v. Glucksberg, illustrating how the Court’s iteration of
what constitutes a fundamental right has evolved over time. Part Two,
Subdivision B, then introduces the Glucksberg test for finding a
fundamental right and the Court’s reasoning behind it. Part Two,
Subdivision C, discusses the Court’s later departure from the test
articulated in Glucksberg for a more fluid analysis under Obergefell.
Part Three, Subdivisions A and B, argue that a fundamental right to a
climate capable of sustaining human life is not deeply rooted in our
nation’s history and was not carefully described when analyzed under
Glucksberg. Part Three Subdivision C further argues that a
fundamental right relating to the environment cannot be sustained
under Obergefell’s reasoning. In conclusion, this Note suggests
alternative and perhaps more suitable mechanisms for plaintiffs to use,
such as those in Juliana, to successfully pursue the rights and remedies
these plaintiffs seek.
JULIANA V. UNITED STATES: THE CASE OF THE CENTURY
In what has been heralded as “the case of the century,”18 twentyone plaintiffs, most members of a disenfranchised class, sought
recompense in the judiciary for generations of harmful conduct

17. See First Am. Compl., ¶ 5, Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC (D. Or. Sept.
10, 2015), ECF No. 7 (framing climate change as threatening fundamental rights to life, liberty,
and property) [hereinafter “First Am. Compl.”].
18. See, e.g., Chelsea Harvey, Trump Could Face the ‘Biggest Trial of the Century’ – Over
Climate Change, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2016, 3:20 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/12/01/trump-could-facethe-biggest-trial-of-the-century-over-climate-change/ (quoting law professor Mary Wood).
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sanctioned by the federal government in the hope that one branch
would provide them the rights they know to be fundamental.19
Originally, the plaintiffs brought suit against President Obama20
and numerous federal executive agencies alleging that the federal
government for more than 50 years “permitted, encouraged, and
otherwise enabled continued exploitation, production, and combustion
of fossil fuels . . . deliberately allow[ing] atmospheric [Carbon Dioxide
(CO2)] concentrations to escalate to levels unprecedented in human
history, resulting in a dangerous destabilizing climate system.”21 Such
egregious conduct, the plaintiffs assert, constitutes a violation of rights
owed to them pursuant to the Constitution of the United States.22
Specifically, the plaintiffs claim the defendants violated their
substantive due process and equal protection rights under the Fifth
Amendment, rights protected by the penumbra of the Ninth
Amendment, and rights under the public trust doctrine.23
Unsurprisingly, the government moved to dismiss the case, arguing
that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing for failure to plead a
particularized injury; the plaintiffs could not sustain a claim under the
Constitution because no right relating to GHG emissions exists; and
the Court lacked jurisdiction over the public trust doctrine claims.24

19. See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp.3d 1224, 1241 (D. Or. 2016) (observing that the
majority of the plaintiffs are unable to vote because they are below the age of eighteen, forcing
them to rely on others to protect their political interests).
20. Once President Trump took office, he was replaced as the named defendant for the
Office of the President until he was eventually dismissed from the case in 2018. Juliana v. United
States, 339 F. Supp.3d 1062, 1080 (D. Or. 2018).
21. First Am. Compl., ¶ 5 (emphasis added).
22. Id.
23. See id. ¶¶ 277–310 (stating claims for relief based on each doctrine). The plaintiffs aver
that the climate system is essential to their rights to life, liberty, and property, which are
safeguarded by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. These rights, they claim, have
been, and are continuing to be, knowingly infringed upon by the government’s reliance on fossil
fuels. Id. ¶¶ 84–85. Their equal protection claims are grounded in the argument that the effects
of climate change will be inherently realized in the future; their generation and those that come
after should be treated as a protected class to avoid any disproportionate discrimination. Id. ¶
297. The Ninth Amendment penumbra, it is alleged, provides further protection as it mandates
that the enumeration of certain rights “shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the People.” Id. ¶ 303; U.S. Const. amend. IX. Finally, the plaintiffs claim the natural resources
that are of public concern to citizens—such as the atmosphere, bodies of water, and biosphere—
are the nation’s life-sustaining systems and they must be held in trust for the benefit of present
and future citizens, something the government is failing to do. First Am. Compl., supra note 21,
¶ 308.
24. See Federal Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authority in Support of Their
Motion to Dismiss, Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC (D. Or. Nov. 27, 2015), ECF
No. 27-1 (arguing that plaintiffs alleged a generalized grievance and not a particular harm, that
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The decision to determine the fate of the lawsuit was first vested
in Magistrate Judge Thomas Coffin. In the early spring of 2016, Judge
Coffin denied the government’s motion to dismiss.25 Short-lived,
though, was the plaintiffs’ initial victory; the case was sent to the district
court to determine if Judge Coffin’s decision would be adopted.26 After
a hearing, District Court Judge Ann Aiken issued a first of its kind
opinion.27 In her groundbreaking opinion denying the government’s
motion, Judge Aiken not only echoed the reasoning of Judge Coffin
but also
clarified and articulated holes in the government’s
28
arguments. Judge Aiken began by discussing whether the plaintiffs’
claims raised a political question.29 In summarizing her analysis of the
case under factors laid out in Baker v. Carr,30 Judge Aiken noted that
a violation of constitutional rights is at the very epicenter of the
allegations making the judiciary the proper forum for relief.31
Next, she addressed the question of standing. The government
argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing under Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife32 because: their injury was not particularized; the
there is no substantive due process right to be free of greenhouse gases and climate change, and
that the Public Trust Doctrine claims belong in state court).
25. Order and Findings & Recommendations, Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517TC (D. Or. Apr. 8, 2016), ECF No. 68.
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2018) (saying that district court judges “may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge”).
27. See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp.3d 1224, 1262 (D. Or. 2016) (stating that the
defense’s argument that “recognizing a federal public trust and a fundamental right to climate
system capable [sic] of sustaining human life would be unprecedented,” but rejecting the
argument as justification for dismissal).
28. Id. at 1235.
29. Id. at 1235–42.
30. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Baker involved a claim by certain voters of counties
in Tennessee in which they sought a declaration that a state apportionment statute was
unconstitutional, depriving them of equal protection of the law. Id. at 187–88. The Supreme Court
in holding that the plaintiffs presented a justiciable question espoused six factors, each capable of
establishing a political question, to determine whether a plaintiff had, in fact, raised a nonjusticiable political question. Id. at 217. Judge Aiken addressed each factor under Baker, finding:
no constitutional provision puts the issue of climate change within the purview of other branches;
the dispute at bar is neither beyond the competence of the court nor in want of a standard by
which to be adjudicated; the redress plaintiffs seek would not offend another branch’s current
actions or ability to act in the area of climate change; and it was undisputed that the final Baker
factors did not apply. Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1237–41.
31. Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1241. Judge Aiken, aware that if plaintiffs were to prevail on
the merits her holding would require a carefully crafted remedy to avoid infringing upon the
separation-of-powers, explained that federal courts are given wide latitude “to fashion practical
remedies when confronted with complex and intractable constitutional violations.” Id. at 1242.
32. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). Lujan requires that three elements be
met for plaintiffs to have standing. The first element, injury in fact, is met where there is an
invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized as well as actual or
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government’s conduct was far too attenuated to be causally linked to
the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries; and the relief the plaintiffs sought was
too broad in scope to be implemented.33 Judge Aiken remained
unpersuaded. Citing Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent,
Judge Aiken explained that, although the injuries may have the same
root and may be shared by every American, the specific concrete
injuries plaintiffs allege were not generalized grievances.34 Despite the
concrete and particularized nature of plaintiffs’ injuries, Lujan still
required the judge to determine whether the injuries were either actual
or imminent.35 After referencing several portions of the plaintiffs’
complaint, Judge Aiken found the injuries to be sufficiently imminent
and actual.36
The Court also found the government’s reliance on Washington
Environmental Council v. Bellon37 to support its causation argument to
be misplaced because Bellon was easily distinguishable from Juliana.
In Bellon, only five oil refineries were allegedly responsible for
producing a mere six percent of Washington’s total GHG emission
which could not have reasonably been linked to the plaintiffs’ injuries.38
The plaintiffs in Juliana, however, allege that the United States
government, over a 263-year period, was responsible for more than 25
percent of global emissions.39 The Bellon holding, therefore, was not
controlling in deciding the case at bar; the Juliana plaintiffs, at the
imminent. Id. at 560. Second, a causal connection must be established between the conduct and
the injury, meaning that the injury is traceable to the action of the defendant not some other third
party. Id. Lastly, a favorable decision must likely redress the plaintiffs’ injuries. Id.
33. Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1242–48.
34. Id. at 1243 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (“[I]t does not matter
how many persons have been injured by the challenged action” so long as “the party bringing suit
shows that the action injures him in a concrete and personal way.”)); see Fed. Election Comm’n
v. Akins, 524 US. 11, 24 (1998) (“[A]n injury . . . widely shared . . . does not, by itself,
automatically disqualify an interest for Article III purposes. Such an interest, where sufficiently
concrete, may count as an injury in fact.”).
35. See Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1243 (“In an environmental case, a plaintiff cannot
demonstrate injury in fact merely by alleging injury to the environment; there must be an
allegation that the challenged conduct is harming (or imminently will harm) the plaintiff.”).
36. Id. at 1244.
37. Wash. Env’t Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2013).
38. See Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1245 (“[C]ausation was lacking because the defendant oil
refineries were such minor contributors to greenhouse gas emissions, and the independent thirdparty causes of climate change were so numerous, that the contribution of the defendant oil
refineries was ‘scientifically undiscernible.’” (quoting Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1144)).
39. Id. at 1243 (emphasis added). Additionally, Bellon was decided at a different procedural
posture—the summary judgment phase of the case. This is important to note because the Bellon
Court issued its decision based upon all the findings elucidated during discovery not simply the
pleadings. Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1144–47.
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motion to dismiss stage, had sufficiently drawn the connection between
their injuries and the governmental action.40
Turning to redressability, the plaintiffs only had to show a
substantial likelihood that a decision rendered in their favor would
retard or eliminate the harm.41 Judge Aiken determined that plaintiffs’
request for relief sufficiently met the standard. The United States is
one of the largest producers of GHGs in the world, and any reduction
in the emission of GHGs would work to slow the devastating effects of
climate change thereby redressing the plaintiffs’ injuries.42 Moreover,
given the complex and intricate explanations required to answer the
questions necessary to understand the scope of the plaintiffs’ injuries,
the defendants’ causation, and the proper remedy, Judge Aiken noted
expert testimony was necessary.43 Dismissing the case at the current
juncture, therefore, would be an improper exercise of judicial
discretion.44
In perhaps the most famous and controversial portion of the
opinion, Judge Aiken recognized the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment protects “a right to a climate capable of sustaining human
life” as it “is fundamental to a free and ordered society.”45 Recognizing
the fundamental right afforded plaintiffs’ claims of constitutional
violations the highest standard of judicial review: strict scrutiny.46 To
establish the existence of the right, Judge Aiken first set out the test as
iterated by the court in McDonald v. City of Chicago.47 Under

40. Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1243.
41. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525 (2007) (saying that plaintiffs must show
that a remedy will “slow or reduce” their particular harm).
42. Hammersley, supra note 16, at 13.
43. See Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1247–49 (noting how “scientifically complex” the
redressability and causation issues at hand are, saying that none of the complex questions can be
addressed at the motion to dismiss stage).
44. See id.
45. Id. at 1250 (“Exercising my ‘reasoned judgment,’ I have no doubt that the right to a
climate system capable of sustaining human life is fundamental to a free and ordered society.”).
46. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993) (describing how strict scrutiny under
due process “forbids the government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no
matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest”).
47. Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1249. The plaintiffs in McDonald alleged a fundamental right
to possess firearms when arguing that a Chicago law restricting the possession of firearms to those
with the proper certification infringed on their rights under the Second Amendment. McDonald
v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). Judge Aiken, after listing the prongs of the test, then cited
to Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), to explain judges must be wary of expanding
the list of fundamental rights. Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1249. Importantly, Glucksberg, a case
alleging a violation of a fundamental right under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
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McDonald, a fundamental right will be sustained should it be shown
that the right for which protection is sought is either “deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition” or “fundamental to our scheme of
ordered liberty[.]”48 Judge Aiken, having exploited McDonald’s
disjunctive by resting the right in its latter prong, effectively
circumventing the rigidity of the Glucksberg49 test, took to a more
recent Supreme Court precedent.50
Obergefell v. Hodges instead provided Judge Aiken with the
framework to uphold her finding of the plaintiffs’ claimed fundamental
right. 51 Justice Kennedy’s “reasoned judgment” analysis allowed Judge
Aiken to be guided rather than bound by history.52 Judge Aiken drew
comparisons with other landmark cases, such as Roe v. Wade, to show
that Supreme Court Substantive Due Process jurisprudence is wrought
with instances of the Court finding unenumerated rights in more than
one Constitutional source where such right is vital to the exercise of
other protected rights.53
Juliana’s one-of-a-kind holding did not aver that the right as
defined therein meant just any claim where it could be argued that
harm was inflicted unto the environment was an infringement of the
fundamental right.54 Instead, Judge Aiken attempted to define the
scope of the right she articulated by narrowing its application to only
cases where “a complaint alleges governmental action is affirmatively
and substantially damaging the climate system in a way that will cause
human deaths, shorten human lifespans, result in widespread damage

Amendment, clearly set out a two-pronged test for finding a fundamental right. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. at 720–21.
48. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (internal citations, quotations, and emphasis omitted).
49. For a discussion on Glucksberg, see infra Part Two Subdivision B.
50. See Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1249 (relying on Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644
(2015)).
51. For a discussion on Obergefell, see infra Part Two Subdivision C.
52. Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1249–50 (citing Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 664 (internal quotations
omitted)).
53. See id. (describing how the fundamental right to privacy in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), was nested in the Due Process Clause, but also had roots in the First, Fourth, Fifth, and
Ninth amendments, while the right to marry in Obergefell was seen as a right supporting many
other fundamental liberties).
54. See id. at 1250 (describing how Aiken sought to “strike a balance and to provide some
protection against the constitutionalization of all environmental claims” by “framing the
fundamental right at issue as the right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life”).
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to property, threaten human food sources, and dramatically alter the
planet’s ecosystem[.]”55
Successfully arguing the existence of a fundamental right,
however, only provides protection from government action infringing
upon that right. Generally, fundamental rights do not impose a duty to
affirmatively remedy injury caused by a party’s actions.56 Judge Aiken,
however, noted two exceptions to this rule, one of which she found
relevant: the “danger creation” exception.57 The plaintiffs alleged the
defendants were fully aware of the consequences associated with
continued reliance on the consumption of fossil fuels as a main source
of energy.58 They further alleged the Due Process Clause imposed a
special duty on defendants to use their statutory and regulatory
authority to reduce greenhouse gas emissions because of their
knowledge.59 Accepting the factual allegations as set forth in the
complaint to be true—a requirement at the motion to dismiss stage,
Judge Aiken sustained plaintiffs’ due process claims, finding the
plaintiffs met their burden in pleading that the government created
danger.60
Finally, the court addressed whether the plaintiffs’ claims
sounding in the public trust doctrine may proceed.61 The government

55. See id. (“To hold otherwise would be to say that the Constitution affords no protection
against a government’s knowing decision to poison the air its citizens breathe or the water its
citizens drink.”).
56. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (saying
that “nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the
life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors”).
57. Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1251. Under the “danger creation” exception, a plaintiff must
show the government created the danger he or she would not have otherwise faced, placing them
in a worse position; the plaintiff must then show the government knew the risks plaintiff would
face but still acted intending to subject plaintiff to such risks, and did so with deliberate
indifference or culpability which exceeds that associated with gross negligence. Id. The other
exception to the general rule that there is no right to government aid is the “special relationship”
exception, which maintains that an individual’s safety becomes the government’s responsibility
when taken into government custody against their will. Ketchum v. Alameda Cty., 811 F.2d 1243,
1247 (9th Cir. 1987).
58. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 278–79.
59. Id. at ¶ 278–280.
60. Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1252.
61. Id. at 1253–61. The Public Trust Doctrine provides public lands, waters, and living
resources in a State are held in trust by the State for the benefit of all of the people. It establishes
the right of the public to fully enjoy public lands, waters, and living resources for a host of
recognized public uses. The doctrine also sets limitations on the States, the public, and private
owners, as well as establishing the responsibilities of the States when managing these public trust
assets. John Arnold, Examining the Public Trust Doctrine’s Role in Conserving Natural Resources
on Louisiana’s Public Lands, 29 TUL. ENV’T. L.J. 149, 195 (2017).
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argued they must not because: the atmosphere is not a public trust
asset; the federal government has no public trust obligations, as any
common law claims have been displaced by federal statutes; and
plaintiffs lack the ability to enforce the federal public trust doctrine,
should it exist.62 Addressing the scope of “assets” held in trust for the
public first, the court declined to determine whether it included the
atmosphere as the plaintiffs only complained of a violation of the
public trust doctrine with respect to the ocean.63
Next, in finding that PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana64 could not
be read to relegate the doctrine’s application to only that which may
be used against a state, the court found the doctrine could, in fact, be
applied to the federal government.65 Judge Aiken then explained that
common law had not been displaced by federal legislation as the
defendants further contended, again distinguishing the government’s
supporting case law from the case at bar.66
Lastly, Judge Aiken began her analysis of whether the plaintiffs
had the ability to enforce the public trust doctrine by identifying its
constitutional origin.67 Agreeing with Judge Coffin’s findings that the
Public Trust claims are properly delineated as substantive due process
claims, she referred to her prior discussion that “the Due Process
Clause’s substantive component safeguards fundamental rights that
are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ or ‘deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition.’”68 The plaintiffs’ claims satisfied both
tests.69 Therefore, all of the plaintiffs’ claims were allowed to proceed

62. Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1255.
63. See id. (emphasizing that because plaintiffs “have alleged violations of the public trust
doctrine in relation with the territorial sea,” it was not yet necessary to determine if the doctrine
extended to the atmosphere).
64. PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576 (2012).
65. See Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1256 (saying that PPL Montana “cannot fairly be read to
foreclose application of the public trust doctrine to assets owned by the federal government” and
could not support the government’s position).
66. Id. at 1257–60.
67. See id. at 1260–61 (arguing that “the public trust predates the Constitution” in defining
“inherent aspects of sovereignty” that existed under Social Contract theory).
68. Id. at 1261 (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010)).
69. See id. (specifying that the public trust claim satisfied both tests). Judge Aiken also noted
that “[b]ecause the public trust is not enumerated in the Constitution, substantive due process
protection also derives from the Ninth Amendment.” Id. (citing U.S. Const. amend. IX (“The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.”)).
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to the discovery phase, and the government’s motion to dismiss was
denied.70
The government, however, remained undeterred and sought relief
through an application for interlocutory appeal in March of 2017.71 A
few months later in June, the government’s order was denied.72 The
very next day, the government sought mandamus relief in the Ninth
Circuit, requesting a stay of district court proceedings.73 The Ninth
Circuit ordered a stay and further ordered the plaintiffs to submit
opposition papers.74 After hearing oral arguments in December, the
Ninth Circuit denied the government’s petition as premature.75 Trial
was again set, but the government attempted to avoid it by filing
several more motions, and in July of 2018, Judge Aiken, again, sat for
oral arguments.76 Without waiting for her opinion, the government
filed another writ of mandamus in the Ninth Circuit to no avail.77
Days later, the Supreme Court weighed in on the litigation,
responding to the government’s petition.78 The Court dismissed the
request without prejudice, finding it premature.79 The Court did take
the opportunity to call the “breadth of plaintiffs’ claims striking” and
note that the “justiciability of those claims presents substantial grounds
for difference of opinion.”80 The Court also encouraged the District
Court to take the aforementioned concerns into account when
assessing “the burdens of discovery and trial, as well as the desirability
for a prompt ruling on the government’s pending dispositive
motions.”81
70. See id. at 1261–62 (asserting that because the plaintiffs’ claims are based in the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, they may assert their claims in federal court, and denying
defendants’ and intervenors’ motions to dismiss).
71. Order Adopting Judge Coffin’s Findings, Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517 (D.
Or. June 8, 2017).
72. Id.
73. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Juliana v. United States, No. 17-71692 (9th Cir. June 9,
2017). Trial had previously been set for February 5, 2018. OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST,
https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/juliana-v-us.
74. Order Staying Proceedings, Juliana v. United States, No. 17-71692 (9th Cir. July 25,
2017).
75. See In re United States, 884 F.3d 830, 835 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[T]heir current request for
mandamus relief is entirely premature.”).
76. Oral Argument, Julianna v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC (D. Or. July 18, 2018).
77. In re United States, 895 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2018).
78. United States v. United States Dist. Court for Dist. of Or., 139 S. Ct. 1 (Mem.) (2018)
(denying the Government’s application for stay).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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The government unabashedly filed another motion to stay
discovery and trial, which was set for October 29, 2018, as well as
another writ of mandamus in the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme
Court.82 The Supreme Court again denied the government’s petition.83
On November 8, after a panel of the Ninth Circuit granted the
government a stay of trial, pending consideration of the defendant’s
most recent writ of mandamus, the government moved for yet another
stay.84 Judge Aiken then certified the case for interlocutory appeal, and
the Ninth Circuit granted the defendant’s petition for interlocutory
appeal thereafter.85 Oral Arguments were then scheduled and heard.86
In a two to one split decision with a blistering dissent, the
judgment of the district court was reversed on January 17, 2020.87 The
Ninth Circuit, however, did not reach the merits of the plaintiffs’
arguments. Instead, the three-judge panel decided the case on the
threshold question of standing, requiring the court to assume the
validity of the plaintiffs’ substantive claims.88 The majority embraced
with open arms the evidence showing that “climate change is occurring
at an increasingly rapid pace” due to the consumption of fossil fuels.89
The factual findings notwithstanding, and despite the majority’s
finding that the plaintiffs’ injuries were particularized and caused by
the government’s conduct, the court held that an order requiring the
federal government to phase out fossil fuels was outside the scope of
the court’s power.90 Exploiting the impassioned arguments of the
dissenting opinion, on March 2, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a petition for

82. In re United States, 139 S. Ct. 452 (Mem.) (2018).
83. Id. at 453 (“At this time, however, the Government’s petition for a writ of mandamus
does not have a ‘fair prospect’ of success in this Court because adequate relief may be available
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.”).
84. Order to Stay Proceedings, Juliana v. United States, No. 18-73014 (9th Cir. Nov. 8, 2018).
85. Jenna Lewis, In Atmosphere We Trust: Atmospheric Trust Litigation and the
Environmental Advocate’s Toolkit, 30 COLO. NAT. RES., ENERGY & ENV’T. L. REV. 361, 372
(Summer 2019).
86. See Hearing Reveals Little about Ninth Circuit’s Upcoming Climate Decision, 395 CORP.
COUNSEL’S MONITOR, NL 18, Westlaw (July 2019). During oral arguments, when plaintiffs’
counsel was asked if the judiciary has ever ordered government action on this scale before, she
pointed to several segregation cases; defendants’ counsel responded that those cases were brought
in a piecemeal fashion, not “one gigantic case,” but one Judge was critical of the assertion that a
step-by-step approach was reasonable given the global nature of the issue. See id.
87. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
88. Id. at 1170.
89. Id. at 1166.
90. Id. at 1173.

Torres Macros (Do Not Delete)

Fall 2020]

FOUNDATIONAL BUT NOT FUNDAMENTAL

2/4/2021 2:03 AM

189

rehearing en banc.91 As of the date of this writing, the Ninth Circuit has
not issued a decision on the plaintiffs’ petition.
Weathered and drawn out, Juliana’s controversial holdings have
commanded national attention and spawned no shortage of
scholarship.92 Until Juliana’s recognition of a fundamental right, not a
single federal court had held in favor of a plaintiff asserting such a right
relating to the environment. In fact, when given the opportunity to
break ground in the area, courts have repeatedly and explicitly
declined to do so.93
Many courts have been careful when faced with claims similar to
those in Juliana to leave open the possibility that a fundamental right
to the environment exists.94 For example, one court in particular, also
out of the District of Oregon, was presented with an allegation similar
to that in Juliana.95 The plaintiffs in Animal Defense Fund cited to
Juliana in support of their claim to a fundamental right to wilderness.96
The Court distinguished the right claimed from Juliana, first noting
that under Glucksberg, expanding the breadth of the substantive due
process protections requires at least a “careful description” of the right

91. OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST (last visited Sept. 18, 2020),
https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/juliana-v-us.
92. See, e.g., Daniel Brister, Juliana v. United States, PUB. LAND & RES. L. REV. (2019)
(reviewing the facts and speculating on the possible impacts of the case); Steve Croft, The Climate
Change Lawsuit That Could Stop the U.S. Government from Supporting Fossil Fuels, 60 MINUTES
(CBS Broadcast June 23, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/juliana-versus-united-statesclimate-change-lawsuit-60-minutes-2019-06-23/.
93. See Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1998) (no right to a healthy environment);
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. United States, 404 F. Supp.3d 1294 (D. Or. 2019) (No. 6:18-cv-01860MC) (no right to wilderness); Clean Air Council v. United States, 362 F. Supp.3d 237 (E.D. Pa.
2019) (no right to a life-sustaining climate system); S.F. Chapter of A. Philip Randolph Inst. v.
EPA, 2008 WL 859985 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. C 07-04936 CRB) (no right to be free of climate
change); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 475 F. Supp. 928 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (no right to a
healthful environment nor to be free of allegedly toxic chemicals); Fed. Emps, for Non-Smokers’
Rights v. United States, 446 F. Supp. 181 (D.D.C. 1978) (no right to a clean environment); Pinkney
v. Ohio EPA, 375 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (no right to a healthful environment); Tanner v.
Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (no right to a healthful environment).
94. See Ely, 451 F.2d at 1139 (“While a growing number of commentators argue in support
of a constitutional protection for the environment, this newly advanced constitutional doctrine
has not yet been accorded judicial sanction. . . .”); Pinkney, 375 F. Supp. at 310 (“Therefore, in
light of the prevailing test of a fundamental right, the Court is unable to rule that the right to a
healthful environment is a fundamental right under the Constitution.”); Agent Orange, 475 F.
Supp. at 934 (“Since there is not yet a constitutional right to a healthful environment, (internal
citation omitted), there is not yet any constitutional right under the fifth, ninth or fourteenth
amendments to be free of the toxic chemicals involved in this litigation.”).
95. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 404 F. Supp. 3d 1294 (D. Or. 2019).
96. Id. at 1302.
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claimed.97 Juliana’s right to a stable climate system is actually narrower
than the “right to wilderness” plaintiffs sought, the court explained.
Moreover, the Juliana plaintiffs did not take issue with just any
pollution, they only sought recompense for catastrophic levels of
pollution.98 “Plaintiffs here allege nothing of the sort,” the court
asserted.99 Perhaps, it is because other courts have consistently and
expressly denied the existence of an environmental fundamental right
that the District of Oregon’s careful dance in distinguishing Juliana
seems to be more of an acceptance of the possibility that such a right
does exist—so long as it is properly articulated.100
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE: A HISTORY OF
TRADITION
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment mandates that
“[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law[.]”101 While the Supreme Court has, since its
inception, recognized the Due Process Clause applies to procedural
matters, it was not until a decade before the first study linking human
GHG emissions to climate change was published that the Supreme
Court first expanded its interpretation of the Clause to safeguard
substantive rights as well.102 At the turn of the 20th century, the Court
started to locate and articulate rights that, while not enumerated in the
Constitution, were otherwise fundamental liberty interests, upon
which neither state nor federal government could encroach.103 Like
everything else, though, the newly discovered rights were not absolute
and were bound only by the exercise of certain government power.104
Its limits notwithstanding, Justice Harlan noted:

97. Id. at 1301.
98. See id. at 1302 (saying that the court in Juliana “noted that plaintiffs did not object to
the government’s role in just any pollution or climate change, but rather catastrophic levels of
pollution or climate change.”)
99. Id.
100. See generally id.
101. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
102. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660–61 (1887).
103. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (finding a freedom to contract
between private parties).
104. Id. at 53. Initially, Lochner described the limitations as relating to exercise of
government power as it pertained to “the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the
public.” Id. However, the Supreme Court eventually formulated a new limit, the current
prescription as found in the “strict scrutiny” standard of review. See generally Reno v. Flores, 507
U.S. 292 (1993).
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the guaranties of due process, though having their roots in Magna
Carta’s ‘per legem terrae’105 and considered as procedural safeguards
‘against executive usurpation and tyranny,’ have in this country
‘become bulwarks also against arbitrary legislation.’106
Though, technically, the first rights expressly recognized as
“fundamental” spawned an era infamous for its jurisprudence,107
subsequent decades were marked by the discovery of true fundamental
rights, which are still enforced today. Despite its substantive due
process jurisprudence spanning more than a century, the Supreme
Court has frequently and, as such, seemingly unsuccessfully, aimed at
dictating a test capable of properly outlining the composition of a
fundamental right. Finally, the Court settled on its articulation in
Washington v. Glucksberg.108 Prior to Glucksberg, the Supreme Court
read into the Constitution rights that were in some way established in
American history and tradition, or so they argued.109 Since the analyses
varied, it is necessary to discuss the reasoning employed in determining
what constituted a fundamental right in prior cases before discussing
Glucksberg’s test to provide a comprehensive understanding of the
Court’s guiding framework.
I.

Foundational Fundamental Rights

The concept of fundamental rights has scarcely been widened. In
fact, a single digit denotes the number of unenumerated rights
safeguarded by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments,110 though many have been pleaded since the modern
liberty right was thought into existence in 1923. Due in part to the
judiciary’s awareness that a decision to establish a new right bears a
105. Per legem terrae is Latin for “by the law of the land.” Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 417
(1897).
106. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884)).
107. Caleb Hall, A Right Most Dear: The Case for a Constitutional Environmental Right, 30
TUL. ENV’T. L.J. 85, 94–95 (2016); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (“We
do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch
economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions.”).
108. See Adam Wolf, Fundamentally Flawed: Tradition and Fundamental Rights, 57 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 101 (2002) (arguing that tradition should have no bearing on what constitutes a
fundamental right).
109. Id. at 127–40 (suggesting that different rights beget different analyses).
110. In Malinski v. N.Y., Justice Frankfurter, after discussing the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause, bluntly asserted, “[o]f course the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment has the same meaning.” 342 U.S. 401, 415 (1942). He stated further that “[t]o
suppose that ‘due process of law’ meant one thing in the Fifth Amendment and another in the
Fourteenth is too frivolous to require elaborate rejection.” Id.
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heavy burden, courts have repeatedly reminded their audience of their
reluctance to do so.111 The root of their apprehension likely stems from
the fact that infringement of a fundamental right invokes strict judicial
scrutiny,112 effectively removing the controversy from the political
process as well as the legislature’s purview.113 Strict scrutiny requires
that the government show that it has a compelling interest for
infringing upon a right and that the means are narrowly tailored to
achieve that end.114
Before applying the strictures of strict scrutiny to a fundamental
right, however, the Court would need to determine whether a
fundamental right was implicated in the first place.115 Only when the
Court was satisfied that the alleged right is “so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental[]” was the
Constitution’s shield wielded.116 As the Court changed and society
progressed, substantive due process jurisprudence evinced several
fundamental rights that were safe from government action: the right to
direct the education and upbringing of one’s children;117 the right to
procreate;118 the right to bodily integrity;119 the right to marital privacy

111. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (“As a general matter,
the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because
guideposts for responsible decision making in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended.”);
see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (quoting Collins to argue that the
Court must be careful when expanding substantive due process because doing so largely places
the matter “outside the arena of public debate and legislative action.”).
112. Russell Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due Process Analysis, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 625,
627 (1992).
113. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997).
114. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
115. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1159, 1248 (2020).
116. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (outlining what composes a
fundamental right when addressing a procedural due process issue).
117. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1932) (following Meyer’s and
Pierce’s logic in holding that the Constitution forbids forcing all children and adults to live in
certain narrowly defined family patterns).
118. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 540–43 (1942) (deciding the
case on Equal Protection grounds as the law at issue affected one class of criminals differently
than it would affect another).
119. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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and use of contraception;120 the right to marry;121 and the right to an
abortion.122
One of the first fundamental rights was awarded to families and
teachers. In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court asserted its understanding
that “liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting
the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary.”123 At issue
was a law that forbade teachers at both private and public schools alike
from teaching any language other than English.124 Noting the natural,
strong desire immigrants had to instill values from their country of
origin in their children, and that the American people always valued
education as a matter of the utmost importance, the Court invalidated
the law, as “a desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited
means.”125 A person has certain fundamental rights that must be
respected.126
Years later in Skinner v. Oklahoma, such a right was at issue. A
repeat felon challenged a law that allowed the state of Oklahoma to
sterilize him so that he could not reproduce any offspring unwanted by
society.127 In support of its reasoning, the Court, though ultimately
deciding the case on equal protection grounds, averred that the sanctity
of marriage and the right to procreate were—in an important use of
words —labeled as “fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race.”128 An exercise of the sterilization power would, thus,

120. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (finding the existence of a fundamental right but deciding the case on Equal Protection
grounds).
121. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
122. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). This list is not meant to be exhaustive of every
fundamental right in existence. The Supreme Court has found fundamental rights in other areas
of the Constitution that are outside the scope of this article. See, e.g., McDonald v. Chicago, 561
U.S. 742 (2010) (relating to the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment).
123. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923).
124. Id. at 396.
125. Id. at 402. Just two years later in Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, the Court reaffirmed Meyer’s
holdings, striking down a law that interfered with the liberty of parents to direct the upbringing
and education of their children. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (“The
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any
general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state. . . .”).
126. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402 (“That the state may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to
improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has
certain fundamental rights which must be respected.”).
127. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942).
128. Id. at 541.
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constitute a deprivation of a basic liberty; the right to procreate was a
basic civil right.129
In Rochin v. California,130 the Court expanded the description of a
fundamental right to not only be “so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental”131 but to also
include something “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”132 While
this description did not provide a conceivable scope, the words’ history,
on one end, provided a historical context granting certain terms
workable definitions.133 The Court noted, for example, some words are
so understood that they are merely visual symbols whose meaning
cannot be changed.134 On the other end, some words were not afforded
the luxury of a fixed meaning, requiring courts to employ a “continuing
process of application.”135 Judges may not substitute their personal
appreciations for the strictures that bind them.136 “The vague contours
of the Due Process Clause” are guided by considerations that are
submerged in reason and in compelling legal traditions.137 Due process
requires a disinterested assessment of all the facts, detached evaluation
of conflicting claims, and a judgment that reconciles “the needs both of
continuity and change in a progressive society.”138
Moreover, representing a divergence from the traditional
approach, Griswold and Eisenstadt v. Baird did not rely on whether the
right to use contraception was rooted in American history.139 Instead,
the Griswold Court discussed the ‘penumbras’ associated with the Bill
of Rights and determined that rights related to privacy were found in
129. Id.
130. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
131. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
132. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). Palko involved an appeal by a defendant
after he was convicted of second-degree murder and subsequently ordered to have a retrial, which
ended with him being convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. He argued the
retrial was an infringement of his Fifth Amendment safeguard from ‘double jeopardy,’ and
thereby a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. The Court disagreed. See
id. at 325.
133. Rochin, 342 U.S at 169–70.
134. Id. at 170.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 170–71.
138. Id. at 172 (“In each case ‘due process of law’ requires an evaluation based on a
disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science, on a balanced order of facts exactly and fairly
stated, on the detached consideration of conflicting claims, on a judgment not ad hoc and episodic
but duly mindful of reconciling the needs both of continuity and of change in a progressive
society.”) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
139. Wolf, supra note 108, at 119.
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several amendments.140 Relying on the newfound privacy rights, the
Court then added, just before ending, that privacy (not the use of
contraception) predates the Bill of Rights, political parties, and our
school system.141 Extending the application of Griswold, the Eisenstadt
Court decided the case on Equal Protection grounds but noted, in
dicta, that “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”142 History was
again mentioned, but no relation to the use of contraceptives was
drawn.143
Loving v. Virginia, brought the return of tradition to fundamental
right jurisprudence.144 In few words, the Supreme Court reintroduced
the notion that the freedom to marry has been a crucial personal right
at the root of the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.145 An
infringement on such a basic right on the basis of race was strictly
prohibited by the Due Process Clause.146 The Court here, as it did in
Griswold, did not supplant a narrower right into a broader ‘penumbra’
in order to establish its fundamentality.147
An analysis of tradition in American legal history is found in Roe
v. Wade.148 The Court initially noted that criminal abortion laws were
a “recent vintage” and not stemmed from ancient or common law
origins.149 In fact, early writings discussing abortion at common law
show that the debate surrounding abortion had not been an advent of
modern societies.150 Early 20th century English cases and statutes even
evinced an appreciation for the mother’s life, showing a trend that
moved toward lifting criminal sanctions for abortions arising out of
medical necessity.151 American law showed something different; it

140. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding elements of privacy in the
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments).
141. Id. at 486.
142. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis added).
143. Id.
144. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Compare id. with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
148. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (analyzing American legal history in
reaching its conclusion).
149. Id. at 134.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 137 (discussing a newly enacted abortion law at the time).
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wasn’t until the mid-1800s that abortion restrictions became
commonplace.152Societal perception of the right sought did not vest
solely in legislative enactments, the Court implied, as it also considered
the stance the American Medical Association and the American Public
Health Association took.153 The historical evidence, thus, could only
lead to one conclusion: the right to an abortion was deeply rooted in
our nation’s history.154
Just under two decades later, however, the Supreme Court in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey did not employ such an extensive legal
history analysis in revisiting the right to an abortion.155 Rather, the
Court turned back to a different type of tradition. Due process once
again became a safeguard for rights that could not be determined by
the mere reference to a standard; it was more fluid.156 Instead,
substantive due process claims called for the bench to exercise
“reasoned judgment.”157 Conscious of their duty to define liberty for
all, the Court referenced Roe, Griswold, and Eisenstadt to support their
position because those cases involved personal decisions about the
meaning of procreation and the responsibility and respect for it.158
While substantive due process cases prior to Glucksberg applied
somewhat differing concepts when establishing a new right’s existence,
the lack of a cohesive standard did not leave future courts completely
in want of some framework upon which to base their legal
conclusions.159 The prior decisions show that tradition, either legal
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See generally id.
155. See generally Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992) (in reaching its decision the Court did not employ as extensive legal historical analysis
when compared to earlier decisions like Roe).
156. Id. at 847–51. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J. dissenting) (“Due
process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to
any code. The best that can be said is that through the course of this Court’s decisions it has
represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the
individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society. If the supplying
of content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a rational process, it certainly has
not been one where judges have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take them.
The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history
teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke.
That tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs from it could not
long survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound. No formula
could serve as a substitute, in this area, for judgment and restraint.”).
157. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849.
158. Id. at 853 (“These are intimate views with infinite variations, and their deep, personal
character underlay our decisions in Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey.”).
159. See discussion on Foundational Fundamental Rights, supra Part Two Subdivision A.
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(seemingly American and English) or societal, is an important factor
at the crux of forming a new right.160 The intimacy and personal nature
of the right claimed are likewise essential to the analysis.161 Although
the oft-quoted passage authored by Justice Harlan in Poe called for a
fluid interpretation of the substantive due process rights,162 Glucksberg
shaped a test that is still observed when determining certain
fundamental rights today.

II.

Washington v. Glucksberg: A Fundamental Test

After years of jurisprudence guided by nothing more than vague
overtures and inconsistent analyses, the Supreme Court, in Washington
v. Glucksberg, created a test for determining whether an alleged right
was to be granted the status of “fundamental.”163
The respondents in Glucksberg sought to establish a fundamental
right to physician-assisted suicide. The respondents were four
physicians practicing in Washington, all of whom would occasionally
treat terminally ill patients.164 Washington, at the time, had
criminalized “promoting a suicide attempt.”165 The respondents claim
that but for Washington’s anti-assisted suicide statutes, they would
have helped patients end their suffering.166 The plaintiffs’ asserted
liberty interest sought protection for a “personal choice by a mentally
competent, terminally ill adult to commit physician-assisted suicide.”167
The District Court found the laws unconstitutional; the Ninth Circuit
originally reversed stating that never once in the 205-year history of the
Nation has the right to kill one’s self been found.168 After an en banc

160. See generally Casey, 505 U.S. 833; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942);
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1932); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
161. See generally Casey, 505 U.S. 833; Roe, 410 U.S. 113; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Rochin, 342 U.S. 165; Skinner, 316 U.S. 535;
Moore, 431 U.S. 494; Pierce, 268 U.S. 510; Meyer, 262 U.S. 390.
162. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
163. See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (creating a test for
determining whether a fundamental right exists).
164. Id. at 707.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 708.
168. Id.
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rehearing, the decision was reversed, and the Supreme Court granted
cert.169
Central to the opinion was the Court’s demarcation of the proper
test to use when breaking ground in the realm of fundamental rights.
The newly formed test required the right to be “deeply rooted in the
Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed” and carefully described.170
Since the institution of substantive due process jurisprudence, the
concept that a fundamental right should be firmly established in the
Nation’s origins, in some form, was encompassed in the description of
what constitutes such a right.171 The history and legal traditions as well
as the Nation’s practices provide a framework that curtails the
judiciary’s inclination to shape the Due Process Clause according to its
own ideas.172 The Court made clear that its idea of substantive due
process jurisprudence development has outlined the liberty harbored
by the Due Process Clause through carefully refined concrete examples
of rights found to be deeply rooted in American legal tradition.173 This
method removes, or lessens, the subjective components inherently
involved in judicial review.174 Further explaining its reasoning and
seemingly addressing Rochin, the Court added that the inclusion of a
threshold requirement, the implication of a fundamental right
requiring a higher standard of scrutiny, avoids “the need for complex
balancing of competing interests in every case.”175
To determine whether the respondents’ claims implicated a
fundamental right, the Court first looked to the states’ statutory
history.176 The Court found suicide bans had a long-standing place in
history; the statutes, inclusive of nearly every state, established a
commitment to protect and preserve all human life.177 In support, the

169. Id.
170. Id. at 721.
171. See discussion on Foundational Fundamental Rights, supra Part Two Subdivision A.
172. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (“The doctrine of judicial
self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground
in this field.”).
173. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 710.
177. Id. at 711 (“Indeed, opposition to and condemnation of suicide–and, therefore, of
assisting suicide–are consistent and enduring themes of our philosophical, legal, and cultural
heritages.”)
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Court referenced Anglo-American law dating back 700 years as well as
English treatises from the 18th and 19th centuries that condemned
suicide.178 By the time the Colonies were established, an overall shift in
societal perception of suicide displaced harsh penalties that
accompanied crimes relating thereto.179 This change notwithstanding,
society had not come to accept suicide; rather, society still thought
suicide to be a grievous wrong, illustrated by enacting assisted-suicide
bans.180 Despite ample opportunity to reexamine the laws, the Court
noted, states have continually reaffirmed their place in American
law.181
Under the Court’s reasoning, when determining whether a right is
deeply rooted in this Nation’s history, it is permissible, then, to assess:
laws of the Nations that existed before the United States; laws and
attitudes of other states; treatises discussing societal attitudes and
perception of the right; and the nature of the change, if any, that is
shown between time periods.182
More recent and less discussed than its counterpart, the second
prong of the Court’s test presents more of a challenge initially. What
exactly is required to provide a “careful description” is difficult to
articulate, as an explanation is rarely, if ever, provided.183 The Court in
Glucksberg offers little more. It states each of the ways in which the
physician-assisted suicide right has been described, including the Ninth
Circuit’s description and the respondents’ descriptions.184 To provide
further insight, Justice Rehnquist referred to Cruzan to show that it is
often referred to as the “right to die” case when, in fact, the Court’s
iteration was “more precise:” the “right to refuse lifesaving hydration
178. Id. (citing Cruzan v. Dir. of Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 294–95 (1990)).
179. See id. at 712–13 (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 294 (holding that while many colonies
started with harsh penalties for suicide, they later abolished those penalties)).
180. Id. at 714–15.
181. Id. at 716.
182. See generally id. (holding that review of laws, attitudes, treatises, perceptions, and
changes over time about a right can inform courts as to whether the right is deeply rooted in the
history of a nation).
183. See, e.g., id. at 721–24 (reviewing use of “careful description” analysis in substantive due
process jurisprudence); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. United States, 404 F. Supp.3d 1294, 1301 (D.
Or. 2019) (holding that a plaintiff must use a careful description to start the process of establishing
a right as fundamental); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302–04 (1993) (holding that substantive due
process analysis must begin with a careful description of the right asserted); Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125–27 (1942) (holding that courts have been reluctant to expand
fundamental rights under substantive due process doctrine).
184. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723 (referencing other descriptions of the right, such as “right
to die,” “liberty to choose how to die,” “right to control of one’s final days,” “right to choose a
humane, dignified death,” and “liberty to shape death”).

Torres Macros (Do Not Delete)

2/4/2021 2:03 AM

200

[Vol. XXXI:175

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

and nutrition.”185 He quickly moved to the issue at bar, providing that
the question in the case is actually whether due process safeguards a
“right to commit suicide with another’s assistance,” the self-proclaimed
carefully described right.186
The impression the Court leaves is that the description must not
be overbroad, and, on the other end, it can’t be too narrow. It must
describe exactly what the party is seeking.187 In other words, the right
must be considered in its most specific form.188 Anything more, or less,
would not meet the strict limits of the prong, relegating the claim to
almost certain defeat, as a mere rational basis for infringing on the
“right” would prevail.
The almost insurmountable Glucksberg test reaffirmed the
Court’s reluctance to expand the scope of constitutional protection for
unenumerated rights. Further, forcing complainants to not only
describe their right with near perfect particularity but to also show that
its roots are profoundly embedded in history, outright confronting the
notion
that substantive due process protects an evolving scope of rights.189
Glucksberg’s refusal to exact a standard that recognized the “change in
a progressive society”190 left proponents of the canons expressed in
Poe’s dissent unsatisfied.191 That is, until Justice Kennedy dug around
Glucksberg’s wooden posts to carve out another avenue for finding
fundamental rights.192

185. Id. (quoting Cruzan v. Dir. of Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990)).
186. Id. at 724.
187. See id. at 724 (holding that “the right to commit suicide with another’s assistance” is a
“careful description”); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 (reflecting court’s hesitancy to extend end-of-life
interests beyond denial of food and hydration); Flores, 507 U.S. at 302 (holding that judicial
restraint called for courts to exercise caution when describing liberty interests); Collins, 503 U.S.
at 125 (holding that the Court has been hesitant to extend liberty interests).
188. Dave Rodkey, Making Sense of Obergefell: A Suggested Uniform Substantive Due
Process Standard, 79 U. PITT. L. REV. 753, 756 (2018).
189. Timothy Lydon, If the Parole Board Blunders, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Set the
Prisoner Free? Balancing the Liberty Interests of Erroneously Released Prisoners, 88 GEO. L.J.
565, 578 (2000).
190. C.f. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (recognizing the balance that courts
must strike between continuity and change in progressive society).
191. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 756 (Souter, J., concurring) (supporting Harlan’s analysis);
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that due process requires
a balancing between tradition and breaking tradition).
192. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (holding that the right to marry
is a fundamental liberty).
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Obergefell v. Hodges: A Break from Tradition

Nearly two decades of adherence to the principles formulated in
Glucksberg culminated in a controversy that could not be molded to fit
the immovable boundaries set by the Court. Understanding the
magnitude of its decision, the Court carefully crafted an opinion that
threaded its reasoning through the strictures of Glucksberg, tailoring,
not supplanting, a more fluid design to substantive due process
jurisprudence.193
This tailoring process was conducted via Obergefell. The case
involved 14 similarly situated plaintiffs, all of whom were denied the
ability to legally marry their partner because they were of the same
sex.194 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, conceded that
traditionally marriage had been the union between man and woman.195
Over time, though, this union that was once viewed as a contract
“based on political, religious, and financial concerns” transformed in
several ways to keep up with changing perceptions.196 To illustrate, the
Court took to several decisions, each evincing not just a growing
tolerance but an overall acceptance of same-sex relationships.197 This
change in societal perception and legal footing is at the very crux of
Justice Kennedy’s argument.198
More specifically, the Court held that the Due Process Clause
protects not only those interests enumerated in the Bill of Rights but
also “certain personal choices central to individual dignity and
autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and

193. Id. at 670–71.
194. Id. at 651–55.
195. Id. at 657.
196. Id. at 660 (“Indeed, changed understandings of marriage are characteristic of a Nation
where new dimensions of freedom become apparent to new generations, often through
perspectives that begin in pleas or protests and then are considered in the political sphere and the
judicial process.”).
197. See generally U.S. v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (invalidating the Defense of Marriage
Act); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick and a Texas law
that made same-sex intimacy a crime); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating an
amendment to Colorado’s constitution that discriminated against people based on sexual
orientation); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding the
Massachusetts Constitution guaranteed same-sex couples the right to marry); Baehr v. Lewin, 852
P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (finding a law classified on the basis of sex was subject to strict scrutiny).
198. See Miriam Galston, Polarization at the Supreme Court? Substantive Due Process
Through the Prism of Legal Theory, 11 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 255, 282–83 (2019) (analyzing the
majority opinion and Chief Justice Roberts’ dissenting opinion against the legal theories of
H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller).
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beliefs.”199 Deciphering its scope is an enduring responsibility that “has
not been reduced to any formula.”200 With just one sentence stolen
from Justice Harlan, Obergefell quickly strayed from Glucksberg,
gifting an interpretation of the Due Process Clause that had long been
sought.201 Instead of applying a test, the Clause requires courts to
simply exercise reasoned judgment when establishing liberty
interests.202 Seemingly addressing Glucksberg, the Court concedes that
history and tradition may guide and discipline the assessment,
however, they “do not set its outer boundaries.”203 Using history as a
mere guide and nothing more, thus, prevents the past from ruling the
present.204
The Drafters did not claim to understand the breadth of the
freedoms safeguarded by the Constitution; instead, they vested in
future generations the privilege of enjoying liberty rights as its meaning
is learned.205 Having laid the guiding tenets for its new analysis, the
Court referenced each of the prior cases in which it held the right to
marry was fundamental to emphasize that the “essential attributes of
the right [to marry] based in history, tradition, and other constitutional
liberties inherent in [the] intimate bond” drive whether the rationale
used in the prior cases should apply to same-sex couples.206
The Court found four principles that provide support for
concluding the right to marry is fundamental. The first principle is
couched in the idea that marriage is innate to the concept of individual
autonomy.207 Similar to choices regarding contraception, familial
relationships, procreation and childrearing, choices regarding marriage
are some of the most intimate an individual can make.208 Second,

199. See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 663 (emphasis added) (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453 (1972) (upholding the right to marital privacy)); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484–86 (1965) (establishing the right to use contraceptives).
200. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 663–64 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan,
J., dissenting)).
201. Id. (citing Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
202. Id. at 664 (“That process is guided by many of the same considerations relevant to
analysis of other constitutional provisions that set forth broad principles rather than specific
requirements.”).
203. Id.
204. Id. (“The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times.”).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 665 (citation omitted).
207. Id. (“This abiding connection between marriage and liberty is why Loving invalidated
interracial marriage bans under the Due Process Clause.”) (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
12 (1967)).
208. Id. at 666 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003)).
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marriage supports a “two-person union unlike any other in its
importance to the committed individuals,” a truly intimate
association.209 A third canon is that the right to marry protects children
and families alike, drawing meaning from the tangential rights of
procreation, education and childrearing.210 Precluding same-sex
couples from marrying would, thus, have harmful and humiliating
effects on their children, the Court averred.211 Lastly, marriage is a
“keystone of our social order.”212 These tenets when applied to the
issue of same-sex marriage demonstrate that the Due Process Clause
shields it from any encroachment.213
The Court then pointed out that a class of people is being
prohibited from acting in a way that others were not. By connecting to
the Equal Protection reasoning, the Court further secures the right to
same-sex marriage.214 But, camouflaged in the Equal Protection
reasoning is the Court’s careful maneuvering of the Glucksberg test.215
In no more than three paragraphs the Court acknowledges that
Glucksberg did, indeed, call for a careful description.216 However,
under Supreme Court precedent, the test as used in Glucksberg was
suitable for the right claimed therein, but applying it to a fundamental
right relating to marriage and intimacy would be wholly inconsistent.217
Loving, Turner, and Zablocki all addressed the “right to marry in its
comprehensive sense, asking if there was a sufficient justification for
excluding the relevant class from the right.”218

209. Rodkey, supra note 188, at 762–63.
210. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 668 (“By giving recognition and legal structure to their parents’
relationship, marriage allows children ‘to understand the integrity and closeness of their own
family and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives.’”) (quoting
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013)).
211. Id. at 646.
212. Id. (holding that marriage is “the foundation of the family and of society, without which
there would be neither civilization nor progress.”) (citing Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211
(1888)).
213. See generally id. (holding that the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause
ensure same-sex couples the right to marry).
214. See Rodkey, supra note 188, at 764 (citing Kenji Yoshino, The Supreme Court 2014
Term: Comment: A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147 (2015))
(reasoning that invocation of both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses afforded
plaintiffs a negative right to be free from government intervention and a positive right to enjoy
the marital benefits that opposite-sex couples enjoy).
215. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 671.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. (citations omitted).
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Though critics argue that the majority’s opinion effectively
overruled Glucksberg,219 Justice Kennedy meticulously articulated a
new course for finding certain fundamental rights, careful not to offend
Glucksberg.220 Exceptionally intimate and personal rights relating to or
stemming from the right to marry require courts to examine the alleged
right through a more fluid, evolving lens, exercising reasoned judgment
instead of the unyielding constraints of a test better suited to adjudge
a right dissimilar to marriage.221
NO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO THE ENVIRONMENT
The fundamental right to a climate that can sustain life is not
deeply rooted in the history and traditions of the United States. Under
the current formulation in Glucksberg, as well as in cases that came
before and after, a fundamental right must be shown to be deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and implicit to ordered liberty.222 While
the Juliana court stated in a conclusory fashion that “the right to a
climate system capable of sustaining human life is fundamental to a
free and ordered society[,]” the court provided no binding authority.223
Before citing to another nation’s precedent, Judge Aiken simply
parsed a sentence from Maynard v. Hill to support her one-of-a-kind
holding, drawing parallels between marriage as the foundation of the
family and a stable climate as “quite literally the foundation ‘of society,
without which there would be neither civilization nor progress.’”224 A
closer look, though, proves otherwise.
I.

Environmental Protection is Not Deeply Rooted in History

This Nation’s traditions and legal history show that environmental
preservation in the United States is, when compared to other
fundamental rights, a relatively new concept.225 For instance, the first

219. See id. at 702 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“It is revealing that the majority’s position
requires it to effectively overrule Glucksberg, the leading modern case setting the bounds of
substantive due process.”).
220. See id. at 671 (holding that the standard in Glucksberg is useful for some cases, but it
was not for marriage).
221. See generally id. (adopting a test for determining fundamental rights which respected
Glucksberg but recognized its inability to apply to certain rights).
222. See supra Part Two Subdivision B.
223. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp.3d 1224, 1250 (2016).
224. Id. (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)).
225. See supra Part Two Subdivision A.
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federal environmental law was not enacted until 1899.226 Major federal
environmental legislation did not begin to take force until the 1960s,
around the beginning of the modern environmental movement.227
Moreover, Yosemite, one of the first parks preserving land for public
enjoyment, was not established until 1864 by President Abraham
Lincoln when it was ceded to California.228 In fact, Yellowstone, the
first national park, was created in 1872 when Ulysses S. Grant signed it
into law.229 Further, in 1892, the Supreme Court issued one of the first
opinions that pertained to the preservation of the environment in
Illinois Central.230 In that decision, the Court decided that the Public
Trust Doctrine applied to a portion of lakeshore in Illinois near
Chicago, prohibiting its use to serve the railroad company and
preserving the land in trust for the benefit of the People.231 However,
Illinois Central applied to the state government to hold land in trust for
its constituents, not to the federal government.232
While the federal government has been slow to effectuate change
regarding environmental policies, states have, to some extent, taken
their own initiative. Indeed, six states have provided some element of
environmental protection in their constitutions.233 Arguably evidence
of shifting attitudes, the change in the six states’ constitutions took
place over two decades only before coming to a dead stop—with
environmental amendments remaining dormant since 1987.234 In
Glucksberg, nearly every state outlawed physician-assisted suicide, and
226. See Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401–67 (2006) (prohibiting discarding
of any refuse matter into navigable U.S. waters); see also Andrew Franz, Crimes Against Water:
The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 23 TUL. ENV’T L. J. 255, 255–57 (2010).
227. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1980) (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); 33 U.S.C. §
1251 (1972) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1963) (Clean Air Act).
228. Sarah Corapi, 150 Years Ago, Abraham Lincoln Signed the Yosemite Grant Act, PBS
NEWS HOUR, (June 30, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/yosemite-turns-150.
229. Birth of a National Park, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE,
https://www.nps.gov/yell/learn/historyculture/yellowstoneestablishment.htm (last visited Sept.
25, 2020).
230. See generally Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (holding that the state of
Illinois has fee simple over the lakebed of Lake Michigan).
231. Id. at 404.
232. Sharon Megdal, The Forgotten Sector: Arizona Water Law and the Environment, 1 ARIZ.
J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 243 (2011).
233. See generally Audrey Wall, State Constitutions and Environmental Bills of Right, THE
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS (Sept. 1, 2015), https://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/stateconstitutions-and-environmental-bills-rights (discussing the environmental provisions in the State
Constitutions of Illinois, Pennsylvania, Montana, Massachusetts, Hawaii, and Rhode Island).
234. Id. at 18 (showing Illinois was the first to amend its constitution in 1970 and Rhode
Island was the last in 1987).
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when the opportunity arose to remove those laws, the legislatures
reaffirmed their positions.235 Evidently, only when there is a general
consensus will there be sufficient evidence to do more than tip the scale
ever so slightly in favor of finding a fundamental right relating to the
environment.236
Though the notion of preserving lands dates back more than 140
years, only in 1896 was society made aware of the possibility that GHG
emissions could have a harmful effect on the climate.237 Given the
unprecedented nature of the findings, the study did not receive the
credit it was due until the 1930s when the effects of the Second
Industrial Revolution were more aptly realized.238 For decades, still,
Svante Arrhenius’ study evaded peer review and expansion. It was not
until relatively recently that a general consensus as to the existence of
climate change in the scientific community was obtained.239
The mere fact that the threat from climate change has become
widely recognized does not alone afford the environment protection
implicitly safeguarded by the Constitution. The laws of this Nation
have not proven that the environment, let alone the climate, is worthy
of bearing the “fundamental” status. Perhaps, the failure to shield
anything relating to the environment was an oversight justly imparted
unto the Drafters. The refusal of subsequent generations to manifestly
remedy their shortcomings has guaranteed that, under the current
framework, the Due Process Clause is not the proper mechanism
through which the Juliana plaintiffs may seek redress.
II.

Plaintiffs’ Claimed Right is Not Carefully Described

Assuming the plaintiffs’ claims satisfy the first prong contrary to
the above analysis, they would still have to prove their fundamental
right has been carefully described. A careful description requires the
right to be labeled with precision. Plaintiffs allege that “fundamental
to our scheme or ordered liberty . . . is the implied right to a stable
climate system and an atmosphere and oceans that are free from
dangerous levels of anthropogenic CO2.”240 Claiming a right to a stable
235. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 717 (1997) (reviewing failure of legalization
of physician-assisted suicide in states).
236. C.f. id. (implying that the recognition of a fundamental right only comes with widespread
public consensus).
237. See generally Arrhenius, supra note 14 (discussing the harmful impacts of carbonic acid
on the atmosphere).
238. Harding, supra note 12.
239. Id.
240. First Am. Compl., supra note 17, ¶ 304.
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climate is overbroad and, if established, would cause a flurry of
litigation. The climate is an inherently unpredictable system,
determining the baseline of a stable climate would be nearly
impossible, especially as GHGs continued to be emitted.241
Each of the established fundamental rights has an identifiable
scope,242 making a violation of it more easily ascertainable. The same
cannot be said for a right relating to the environment. For example, an
injury from a violation of the fundamental right to direct the
upbringing of one’s children will stem from a clear source and affect a
family. Infringing on a fundamental right will likely have multiple
sources and affect multiple people. The environment is vast, but
fundamental rights require specificity and a narrow scope. Delineating
what constitutes a violation would cause the right to be so narrow it
only applies in very select situations, effectively caging its purpose, or
so broad that nothing would offend it, rendering the right nothing more
than a shell.
The district court, though, more aptly described the right as one to
a “climate system capable of sustaining human life.”243 However, this
too does not meet the stringent standard required by Glucksberg.
Currently, nothing would offend this right, save a toxic pollution event
so large that its effects would be felt immediately, in that instance there
would be a clear source and a clear right infringed. Additionally, the
injuries plaintiffs endured did not render their environment completely
incapable of sustaining life and do not run afoul of the right created by
Judge Aiken.244 The right the plaintiffs seek is very particular and grand
in scale, so a careful description is unlikely to be articulated given the
breadth of plaintiffs’ claims. Therefore, under Glucksberg, the
plaintiffs’ and the court’s claims must fail as the right to a climate
capable of sustaining human life is neither deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history nor is it carefully described.
III.

Juliana’s Reliance on Obergefell is Misplaced

Perhaps, the reason why Judge Aiken attempted to exploit the
fluidity espoused in Obergefell is that Juliana’s fundamental right
cannot pass Glucksberg’s muster. Juliana requires more
241. Michael Hopkin, Climate Sensitivity ‘Inherently Unpredictable,’ NATURE (Oct. 25, 2007),
https://www.nature.com/articles/news.2007.198.
242. See cases cited infra note 187 (reviewing “careful description” doctrine).
243. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp.3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016).
244. See First Am. Compl., supra note 17 (discussing mostly psychological trauma as the past
harm).
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maneuverability, an analysis that is more malleable to stand a chance.
The right established in Juliana was completely non-existent, requiring
the court to employ its “reasoned judgment.”245 Thereby, the Court
relied heavily on the tenets of Obergefell,246 but for several reasons, that
reliance was fatally misguided.
Obergefell was revolutionary in its own right, not only for its
holding but also for finally adopting the often-cited reasoning
disseminated by Justice Harlan in Poe.247 The evolving standard of a
fundamental right allowed plaintiffs, such as those in Juliana, to argue
that establishing a fundamental right was now justifiable, it could be
couched in an idea that was no longer controlled by history. However,
the Obergefell court was cautious in deviating from Supreme Court
precedent: the fluid analysis penned by Justice Kennedy applied to
liberty interests involving “marriage and intimacy.”248 A right capable
of sustaining human life cannot be said to be encompassed in any
marital right, even if the environment may “underly[] and support[]
other vital liberties.”249 Finding a connection there would serve to
further muddy the already murky water that is substantive due process
jurisprudence.
Resting the right instead in the line of cases that sustain
fundamental rights relating to intimacy provides more of a footing. But
those rights, the right to an abortion and the right to contraception for
example, are deeply personal and are experienced by no two persons
the same.250 They are very intimate decisions that dictate what one does
with one’s own body. The right thus protects a person, exercising selfcontrol, from any government intervening in or dictating how that
person should exercise self-control. In contrast, protecting the
environment from dangerous levels of GHG emissions does not
protect an individual from employing their own faculties in making
personal decisions.
Judge Aiken attempted to circumvent these limitations in
Obergefell by reiterating that courts may find new fundamental rights,
245. Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1250.
246. Id.
247. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542–43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing liberty
as a continuum which includes freedom from purposeless restraint).
248. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 671 (2015) (“Yet while that approach may have been
appropriate for the asserted right there involved (physician-assisted suicide), it is inconsistent with
the approach this Court has used in discussing other fundamental rights, including marriage and
intimacy.”).
249. Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1250.
250. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (discussing the effects of pregnancy).
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as the “generations that wrote the Bill of Rights” did not purport to
know the entire scope of the liberties protected therein.251 Obergefell is
distinguishable because it, as well as the cases on which it relies,
address a discord between constitutional protections and “a received
legal stricture.”252 Surely, the absence of a stricture cannot itself be a
stricture. The plaintiffs in Juliana do not seek to strike down a law that
prohibits them from exercising fundamental liberties. Instead, they ask
for the court to direct the federal government to develop a plan that
moves away from the use of fossil fuels as the main source of energy.253
They ask for positive rights to government action in lieu of negative
rights to be free from government action.254
Importantly, Obergefell also notes in each line of cases involving
the right to marry that the Court asked whether “there was sufficient
justification for excluding the relevant class from the right.”255 In
Juliana, the plaintiffs seek to establish a right for all.256 Obergefell
merely addressed whether an expansion of the current right to marry
was necessary to protect the liberty interests of same-sex couples.257
The Court in Obergefell also noted that there were several decades of
litigation, legislation, and scholarship that all culminated in its
decision.258 Obergefell, in this way, is more closely aligned with Brown
v. Board of Education,259 since the groundbreaking holding took place
in a piecemeal fashion, not simply one fell swoop.260 Juliana attempts
the unprecedented: to create a fundamental right to the environment,
do it with one case, and restrict the government’s abilities. This goes
against a key portion of Obergefell, which simply expanded an already
determined and identifiable scope of an existing right.
While a lack of history is not dispositive under Obergefell, Justice
Kennedy still wrote at length about how both marriage and same-sex

251. Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1249 (quoting Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 664).
252. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 664.
253. Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1233.
254. Rodkey, supra note 188.
255. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 671.
256. See generally Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d 1224 (seeking a right to a habitable climate).
257. See generally Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644 (holding that the right to marry extends to couples
of the same sex).
258. Id. at 661 (citing United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 575 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
259. See generally Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown was one of the only
other instances in which the federal courts have directed the federal government to take action
on such a large scale.
260. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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relationships have changed in the eyes of the law and society.261 It
cannot be denied that society’s views pertaining to climate change have
also changed dramatically in the past decade alone, but in the eyes of
the law it is still the 1970s. Obergefell made the last leap to align the
jurisprudence of protected liberty interests up with society. Juliana
seeks to bridge a gap that is far too wide to be done in one case. As
with the right to marry, a fundamental right relating to the
environment needs to be parsed out, the boundaries must be
discovered before it can begin to be shaped.
Perhaps, Juliana is the Bowers equivalent, but a fundamental right
to a climate capable of sustaining human life is not a liberty interest
protected by the Constitution under the current formulations
governing Substantive Due Process analysis.
CONCLUSION
Twenty-one plaintiffs, most of whom cannot vote for themselves
to obtain a future they desire, sought redress by instituting what would
come to be a groundbreaking lawsuit. From the outset, the plaintiffs’
ask was simple: constitutional protection for a right relating to the
environment. Met by an adversary with seemingly unlimited legal
resources, the plaintiffs managed to not only initially surmount the
government’s arguments seeking dismissal of the case in its entirety but
also secure the very protection they sought. For the first time, District
Court Judge Ann Aiken held the Due Process Clause protected a
fundamental right to an environment that can sustain human life. In
doing so, the judge relied heavily on Justice Kennedy’s adoption of a
fluid analysis for finding such a right as iterated in Obergefell.
However, while Justice Kennedy’s formulation is more in line with
nearly a century of Supreme Court precedent, his deviation from
heavily relying on the history and traditions of the United States is not.
As shown, decades of precedent unforgivingly live and die on the
notion that only those things that are so rooted in the United States’
history and tradition can be said to be essentially implied in the
Constitution. It was these cases that had already culminated in the
Supreme Court’s attempt to delineate a test in Glucksberg. So long as
those rights which were long-established in American history were
carefully described, the Due Process Clause would afford them
protection from government infringement.

261. Obergefell, 574 U.S. at 660–63.
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Understanding this rigidity, Judge Aiken utilized Justice
Kennedy’s model. However, under both analyses, the Juliana right was
found in error. First, under Glucksberg, environmental conservation is
not deeply rooted in American legal traditions. While instances of
environmental conservation arguably predate the first national park,
meaningful steps are few and far between. When compared to other
rights, environmental protection cannot be said to be essentially
implied in the Constitution. Additionally, the court’s description was
not careful enough. It would act to include environmental infringement
not meant to be covered, and if construed narrowly to avoid
overbreadth, it would become toothless.
Second, considering the analysis in Obergefell shows that the right
sought in Juliana does not fit its mold. Obergefell was a part of
piecemeal litigation which expanded a right that already had
boundaries and an identifiable scope. Juliana broke new ground.
Moreover, Obergefell explicitly applied to the most intimate of rights,
the kind that fall under the umbrella of a right to privacy. All of those
rights involve personal decisions, not a decision that will affect others.
As such, the right found in Juliana cannot be sustained under the
current substantive Due Process jurisprudence, leaving the plaintiffs to
search for an alternative method to stave off the impending climate
change threat. Simply because the claims are not supported by
fundamental right jurisprudence does not mean they cannot be sought
in other areas of law or under different doctrines supported by the
Constitution. The Founding Fathers put into place the proper
mechanisms through which the People may remedy their injuries when
one avenue fails to provide the necessary protection.
Arguably the most radical and, perhaps improbable solution,
would be to put the question of whether the Constitution protects the
environment outside the scope of judicial review. Indeed, a
constitutional amendment that shields the environment may be the
answer to the otherwise avoided question.262 The frequent refusal to

262. See generally Daniel Reeder, Federalism Does Well Enough Now: Why Federalism
Provides Sufficient Protection for the Environment, and No Other Model is Needed, 18 PENN ST.
ENV’T L. REV. 293 (2010) (discussing the feasibility of amending the Constitution); Carole
Gallagher, The Movement to Create an Environmental Bill of Rights: From Earth Day, 1970 to the
Present, 9 FORDHAM ENV’T L.J. 107 (1997) (examining proposed amendments to the constitution,
previous environmental legislation as well as environmental legislation since the beginning of the
modern environmentalist movement); Dan Gildor, Preserving the Priceless: A Constitutional
Amendment to Empower Congress to Preserve, Protect, and Promote the Environment, 32
ECOLOGY L.Q. 821 (2005) (exploring the environmental policy landscape before advocating for
an amendment to the Constitution).
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expand the unenumerated rights harbored by the Constitution to
encompass a right pertaining to the environment is clearly indicative of
the need for such an amendment. However, under the current political
climate, it is unlikely that a significant alteration to the Constitution
will be a successful path to securing environmental protection.
Rather, putting pressure on the legislature to enact meaningful
legislation may be a more plausible approach. Less drastic than
amending the Constitution, and still subject to the same political
atmosphere, lobbying for congressional action allows for climate
change and harmful emissions to be combatted with precision not
simply an overarching idea. Over time, the continued passing of
environmental legislation will make even stronger the argument for a
fundamental right under the Due Process Clause, cutting the problem
with both edges of the sword.
However, time is of the essence. Quick action is required, and a
piecemeal plan runs the risk of coming too little, too late. As such, it
may be prudent to address the largest contributors to climate change
with small but still significant impacts, fostering innovation and
technological advancements that are not offensive to important
industries. The controlling ideology in Congress, though, would need
to change presumably through the political process. Since the
beginning of the case, some plaintiffs in Juliana have become of voting
age, and each day more like-minded youths join their coalition. It is
this generation’s voice that Congress will heed.
Until then, constant and unrelenting litigation seeking to expand
the already existing environmental safeguards provides a sound
approach. The boundaries of established doctrines, such as the public
trust doctrine, must be tested in both state and federal courts.263 The
approach taken by plaintiffs in Juliana should be mirrored and not
discouraged by an unfavorable decision. Juliana had several pivotal
holdings other than that which relates to a fundamental right. The
plaintiffs also sought to expand the application of the public trust
doctrine to the federal government, and as noted above, they were
successful, a holding that garnered much scholarship. Several
proponents have made compelling arguments in support of Juliana’s
application of the public trust doctrine.264
263. See Richard Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice
Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 641 (2001) (advocating for environmental regulation primarily
carried out by the States).
264. See generally Michael Blumm & Mary Wood, “No Ordinary Lawsuit”: Climate Change,
Due Process, and the Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (2017) (discussing the worldwide
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In no way are these alternative mechanisms meant to be an
exhaustive list of the remedies plaintiffs may plausibly pursue. A
comprehensive approach is necessary to exact substantial and
meaningful change, especially when faced with a Commander-in-Chief
who is set on regressively revamping American industries hinged on
the consumption and burning of fossil fuels. A continued, unified effort
taking turns wielding the hose will turn the trickle into a force no flame
could surmount.

campaign of atmospheric trust litigation); Michael O’Loughlin, Understanding the Public Trust
Doctrine Through Due Process, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1321 (2017) (analyzing the Public Trust Doctrine
against public trust precedent).

